

## Assignment 7

Issued: 13.06.2023  
Due: 20.06.2023, **10:00h**

### Exercise 7.1 *Signaling Schemes*

(2 + 2 = 4 points)

Consider the following instance of the PERSUADE problem between  $\mathcal{S}$  and  $\mathcal{R}$  as defined in the lecture. There are three boxes and three possible prize-pair vectors, namely  $\theta_1 = ((2, 6), (3, 5), (1, 5))$ ,  $\theta_2 = ((4, 4), (5, 4), (4, 5))$  and  $\theta_3 = ((7, 1), (6, 2), (5, 3))$ . Each prize-pair vector has a probability of  $1/3$  to be drawn by nature.

- State the linear program which derives the optimal signaling scheme  $\varphi^*$  for the given instance. Use the approach described in the proof of Theorem 24.
- Derive the optimal signaling scheme  $\varphi^*$  from the LP and state the expected reward both for  $\mathcal{S}$  and  $\mathcal{R}$ .

*Hint: The calculation of  $\varphi^*$  does not need to be specified.*

### Exercise 7.2 *Direct and persuasive schemes*

(3 points)

Show Proposition 3 from the lecture notes: *For every signaling scheme  $\varphi$  there is a direct and persuasive scheme  $\varphi'$  such that  $\mathcal{S}$  obtains the same expected value in  $\varphi$  and  $\varphi'$ .*

**Exercise 7.3** *RANDOM-ORDER SIGNALING*

(2 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 3 + 3 = 13 points)

In RANDOM-ORDER SIGNALING,  $n$  prize-pairs are revealed to both the sender  $\mathcal{S}$  and the receiver  $\mathcal{R}$  at the beginning. Afterwards, the prize-pairs are packed into  $n$  boxes. The boxes are closed (which makes them look identical), permuted in uniform random order, and then labeled from 1 to  $n$ . Afterwards  $\mathcal{S}$  looks into all boxes and then sends a signal to  $\mathcal{R}$ , who has to choose exactly one of the boxes. If box  $i$  with prize-pair  $(r_i, s_i)$  is chosen, then  $\mathcal{S}$  gets reward  $s_i$  and  $\mathcal{R}$  gets reward  $r_i$ .

- a) Show that there is an optimal scheme  $\varphi^*$  for  $\mathcal{S}$  that is symmetric.
- b) A box  $i$  is Pareto-dominated by box  $j$  if the contained prize-pair is strictly better for both  $\mathcal{S}$  and  $\mathcal{R}$ , i.e., it holds  $r_j > r_i$  and  $s_j > s_i$ .

Prove that a box that is Pareto-dominated is never recommended by  $\mathcal{S}$  in an optimal, direct scheme.

- c) Consider the geometric representation of prize-pairs in the Euclidean plane, as depicted in the example below. Let  $S$  be the convex hull of all prize-pairs, and let  $\text{int}(S)$  denote the interior of  $S$ , i.e., the open convex hull of all prize-pairs.

Extend the given visualization of the example instance:


- Mark the area of possible locations of prize-pairs that (are corresponding to boxes that) are Pareto-dominated.
- Visualize which parts of  $\text{int}(S)$  do **not** intersect with that area.

Explain why boxes with prize-pair in  $\text{int}(S)$  that are **not** Pareto-dominated are never recommended by  $\mathcal{S}$  in an optimal, direct scheme.

- d) Prove: Any direct scheme for RANDOM-ORDER SIGNALING is persuasive if and only if it yields an expected utility of at least  $r_E := \frac{1}{n} \cdot \sum_{i=1}^n r_i$  for  $\mathcal{R}$ .
- e) Describe an algorithm to compute an optimal scheme  $\varphi^*$  in polynomial time. Give an informal argument why your algorithm yields an optimal policy indeed.

*Hint: Use the previous tasks. Which boxes could  $\mathcal{S}$  possibly recommend? What is the optimal weighting of the signals for  $\mathcal{S}$  such that the scheme is persuasive?*

- f) Assume  $\mathcal{S}$  could choose the best box  $i$  for her by herself (instead of sending a signal to  $\mathcal{R}$ ). Show that the ratio of the expected rewards of  $i$  and  $\varphi^*$  for  $\mathcal{S}$  can be up to  $n$ , and this is the worst case.



**Fig. 1:** Example instance with  $n = 8$  prize-pairs. Right: Visualization in the Euclidean plane. Each prize-pair is marked by a cross.

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The assignments and further information on the course are provided on our website:  
<https://algo.cs.uni-frankfurt.de/lehre/oau/sommer23/oau23.shtml>

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